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I - Introduction 
The severe economic crisis that we have been living in since 2008 has brewed a 
new debate on the taxation of the financial sector and the necessity of fiscal consolidation. 
The economic collapse shed a light on the market’s lack of transparency and on its 
inability to function properly without adequate supervision.1 This sector is globally 
percept of being greatly culpable for this economic crisis and, due to the VAT exemption 
in place, indisputably under taxed.  The question “Should taxation play a central role in 
correcting systemic externalities and in shaping the market’s entities toxic behaviour” 
emerged. The practice of risk externalization by the financial sector has proved to be 
detrimental, more so, when allied with the financial sector’s extensive economic role2 and 
the presence of financial institutions qualified as “too big to fail”.  
In response to the economic crisis, governments have implemented several 
measures to avoid the collapse of the financial system. The repercussion of government 
intervention was steep public debt.3 Due to the absence of a considerable contribution 
from the financial sector, Member States were forced to increase taxes in other areas. In 
contrast, the sector has been reporting high levels of profitability over the last two 
decades, which can be perceived as the outcome of a safety net provided by governments 
(moral hazard), the lack of financial sector regulation and the absence of adequate 
taxation.4 The burden of the financial sector collapse was therefore placed in the public, 
which raises serious equity concerns. It is estimated that the costs of the crisis for the 
EU27 was of 15% to 20% of the GDP.5 Once economic equilibrium is attained, 
                                                          
1 See RUUD DE MOOIJ AND GAËTAN NICODÈME (eds), Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector 
(CESifo seminar series. 2014) p. 1. 
2 See SHACKELFORD, DOUGLAS A., SHAVIRO, DANIEL N. AND SLEMROD, JOEL, Taxation and the Financial 
Sector, p. 156 in Taxation and the Financial Crisis (Alworth and Arachi eds., Oxford. 2012).  
3 See Ibid., p. 25. 
4 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, SWD(2013) 29 final (2013), p. 4. 
5 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact Assessment, proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, 
COM(2013) 71 final (2013), p. 8. 
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governments need to recover resources, and take appropriate measures to avoid being in 
the verge of collapse yet again. With this last objective in mind, on the 28th of September 
2011, the European Union Commission assembled a proposal for a Council Directive 
with the intent of implementing FTT – a Financial Transactions Tax.  
The European Commission has established clear objectives for the FTT. First, the 
strengthening of the Internal Market is achieved by the harmonization of legislation, 
which will subsequently diminish distortion of competition throughout the European 
Union. Uncoordinated action is perceived as undesirable, as it encourages relocation and 
promotes the occurrence of double taxation.6 Tax neutrality requires coordination.7 
Second, the FTT is alleged to generate an impediment for transactions which do not 
develop productivity or stability of financial markets. The “polluter pays principle” 
requires a fair and substantial contribution of financial institutions,8 consequently this tax 
seems to follow a backward-looking, revenue raising approach.9 Third, revenue raised by 
the FTT will contribute to the creation of own resources for the EU budget. Further, the 
success of such tax at a regional level, will contribute to a possible future global 
implementation.10  
Notwithstanding the opposition to the introduction of a tax, proponents defend 
FTT’s potential. Besides being able to raise high revenues, it will address speculation and 
diminish high speed, short-term trading, understood as harmful to the functioning of 
markets. Consequently, a decline in volatility will be accomplished. Opponents who 
claim that the FTT will have negative effects on markets’ efficiency, hypothesize a 
straight connection between liquidity and efficiency. However, this straight connection is 
far from settled. Indeed, several authors that perceive liquidity as beneficial up to a certain 
                                                          
6 See ibid., p. 10. 
7 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, p. 3. 
8 See ibid., p. 2. 
9 See DEVEREUX, MICHAEL P., New Bank Taxes: Why and What Will Be the Effects?, p. 26 in Taxation and 
Regulation of the Financial Sector (Ruud de Mooij and Gaëtan Nicodème eds., CESifo seminar series. 
2014).  
10 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION , Impact Assessment, proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing 




level, argue that any transaction past that does not contribute to the well-functioning of 
the sector.11 
Once it became clear that a unanimous decision on a common system of FTT was 
not possible, eleven Member States12 addressed a formal request to the Council declaring 
their wish of instituting an enhanced cooperation.13 The Council recognized that the legal 
preconditions were completed.14 It was concluded that the implementation of a common 
system of FTT respects the rights, competences and obligations of non-participating 
Member States. The proposal is directed at the harmonisation of indirect taxation, in an 
area which does not belong to the exclusive competence of the Union. Finally, the 
existence of a uniform tax will not weaken the internal market, as a matter of fact, it will 
reinforce it.  Indeed, the introduction of a transaction tax by an individual Member State, 
will not contribute to the appropriate functioning of the internal market, avoid distortion 
of competition, or discipline the financial sector. To summarize, the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principle will not be disrupted with enhanced cooperation in this matter.15  
The proposed tax is specific, cumulative and indirect,16 targeting gross financial 
transactions before netting. It is characterized by its low tax rates,17 and broad-base. By 
                                                          
11 See for example EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FTT Non-technical answers to some questions on core 
features and potential effects (2013), p. 5.; SCHULMEISTER, STEPHAN, SCHRATZENSTALLER, 
MARGIT AND PICEK, OLIVER, A General Financial Transaction Tax: Motives, Revenues, Feasibility 
and Effects (WIFO. 2008) p. 8.  
12 Which include Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Spain. 
13 See Article 20 TEU and Article 329 TFEU. 
14 See Council Decision 2013/52/EU of 22 January 2013, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D0052. 
15 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact Assessment, proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, 
p. 10. 
16 See HENKOW, OSKAR, The FTT Proposal- An Overview of Legal Issues Arising, p. 23 in Taxing the 
Financial Sector Financial taxes, Bank Levies and more (Marres, Otto and Weber, Dennis eds., IBFD. 
2012). 
17 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 




taxing all financial instruments,18 all financial institutions and markets,19 tax neutrality is 
attained. To assure the tax does not negatively affect the financing of institutions and 
states, and that it does not diminish market efficiency, exemptions were included.20  
Chargeability is born at the moment the transaction is implemented, in other words, when 
a sale or purchase of financial instruments occurs, or when a modification or conclusion 
of derivatives agreements takes place.21 The definition of the taxable amount acquires 
particular complexity in the case of derivative contracts.22 In those cases, the taxable base 
of the FTT is based on the notional amount, mentioned in the contract at the time of the 
transaction.23 As for the tax liability itself, the tax is to be paid at both ends of the 
transaction, if a financial institution is involved at each respective end, hence liability 
falls solely on financial institutions.  
 
II- Structure 
The proposed directive’s territorial legitimacy has been questioned by critics, 
particularly in the light of the introduction of the counterparty principle. The objective of 
this thesis is to understand the arguments presented by opponents, and ultimately refute 
those allegations by corroborating the proposal’s territorial legality.  
The first chapter follows the evolution of International law, concerning matters of 
territorial sovereignty, and introduces the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
second chapter is divided into four different territorial perspectives of the proposed 





                                                          
18 See ROHATGI, ROY, Basic international taxation (London: Kluwer Law International. 2002) p. 561. 
19 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, Article 2. 
20 See ibid., Article 3 (2) and (4). 
21 See ibid., Article 5. 
22 See ROHATGI, ROY, p. 564. 
23 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 







Sovereignty highlights the supremacy of governmental institutions internally, 
while externally it solidifies the state’s condition as a legal person. A state is only 
perceived as a legal person if it has a territorial base.24 This affirmation highlights how 
sovereignty is intertwined with the territorial principle.  
Jurisdiction is a key concept of sovereignty. As held by Maan the concept of 
jurisdiction draws the limits of a State’s sovereignty and upholds the duty to recognize 
the same right to other States.25 It is qualified by Malcom Shaw as the power of a state, 
under international law, to regulate or otherwise impact upon people, property and 
circumstances.26  
Jurisdiction can be divided into three sub-pillars. The first is jurisdiction to 
prescribe, or to legislate. Second, jurisdiction to adjudicate, which is strictly connected 
with a country’s judicial system. Lastly, jurisdiction to enforce, or execute. A distinction 
is necessary between enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction. In the latter, the 
possibility of creating laws directed at foreign circumstances, is recognized. The same 
does not apply to enforcement jurisdiction.27 Maan criticizes this assessment, arguing it 
is unattainable to regard jurisdiction to legislate private law as unlimited.28 Harold 
G.Maier emphasizes the unimportance of this particularity, as the enactment of rules 
presumes its prospect execution. The author perceives jurisdiction as a matter of degree, 
a unitary phenomenon with diverse phases of application. As extraterritoriality is an 
outcome of the idea of jurisdiction, it can also be understood as having dissimilar stages 
                                                          
24 See SHAW, MALCOM, International Law (Cambridge University Press 6th ed. 2008) p. 487. 
25 SEE MAAN, FREDERICK A., The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction: Revisited after Twenty Years, p. 
20 in Jurisdiction in International Law (Reisman, Michael W. ed., Ashgate. 1999). 
26 See SHAW, MALCOM, p. 645. 
27 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, Jurisdiction in International Law – USA and European perspectives (Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven Faculteit Rechtsgeleerdheid. 2007) p. 22. 
28 See MAAN, FREDERICK A., p. 21. 
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of intensity, depending on its degree of imposition to other states.29 
Jurisdiction is likewise subdivided into personal, territorial and functional.30 
Personal sovereignty is profoundly linked with nationality, while territorial sovereignty 
is connected with residence. An economic fiscal attachment is produced once an 
affiliation between the state and the fiscal subject, through the object of tax located in the 
taxing state, exists. 
The purpose of the following chapter is to, not only examine further sovereignty’s 
and jurisdiction’s definition, but likewise to comprehend the different doctrines which 
outline its limits.   Within the concept of jurisdiction, the only significant matter to this 
thesis is tax jurisdiction. The limitations imposed on the power to tax, especially when 
dealing with facts which have a link with more than one country, are the core of this 
chapter. Initially, a short analysis of the Classical International law doctrine in 
juxtaposition to the Lotus case is accomplished. Additionally, the contributions of the US 
are considered. These range from the effects doctrine, to the concept of other States 
interests and finally to the draft of a Restatement. The protective principle is regarded as 
an additional limitation to the exercise of taxation. The last limitation considered consists 
of the substantial and genuine connection, which is regarded as the foundation for 
territoriality in contemporary customary International Law. Lastly, a reference is made to 
the matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
1.1 Jurisdiction to tax 
A state’s jurisdiction to tax is acknowledged as a feature of statehood or 
sovereignty, restricted by international law.31 Jurisdiction is traditionally associated with 
territory, though this may not always be the case. Even though territorial sovereignty is, 
still, an essential concept of international law, as a result of technological advances, 
globalization and the increasing interdependence of States, its importance has been 
diminishing.32  
 Rules and principles regarded as customary international law integrate the 
                                                          
29 See MAIER, HAROLD G., Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law, p. 78 in Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in theory and practice (MEESSEN, KARL ed., London: Kluwer Law International. 1996). 
30 See ibid., p. 23. 
31 See ALBRECHT, A.R., The Taxation of Aliens Under International Law, p. 148 in British Year Book of 
International Law (Lauterpacht, H. ed., Oxford University Press. 1952). 
32 See SHAW, MALCOM, p. 488. 
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framework which limits States’ tax jurisdiction. Custom in contemporary legal systems 
is regarded as trivial. In international law, the contrary is observed, custom is understood 
as a dynamic and imperative source of law. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on its 
value. Its uncertainty is perceived as a weakness, however, the inexistence of a centralised 
international system requires a source of law as flexible as custom. Custom is composed 
by two basic elements, material facts and the subjective belief that such behaviour 
constitutes a legal obligation.33 
 
1.1.1. Classical International Law Doctrine and the Lotus Case 
Jurisdiction can be perceived in two different manners, the first of which, applied 
in the Lotus case, proclaims its exercise in the way States see fit unless there is a 
prohibitive rule. The lack of a general prohibition does not entail the uncontrolled 
intrusion of States in each other’s domestic affairs, it simply acknowledges the legal 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction.34 The second approach, the classical international 
law doctrine, affirms that States are not authorized to exercise their jurisdiction, unless 
their action is based in an international legal rule.35 The latter view is vastly dubious due 
to the abstract nature of international principles, which seem, at times, to disregard the 
complexity of reality. Furthermore, the dogma is tainted by the obsolescent perception of 
state dominion, grounded on a strict and simplistic notion of the territoriality principle.36 
The classical international law doctrine is connected with the principle of non-
intervention, by which, States are prohibited from intervening in the domestic affairs of 
other States.37  
Although the Lotus case has been heavily criticized, and considered obsolete by 
some authors, it is still an orientation in matters of jurisdiction, as it is the only judgment 
where an international court directly ruled on this problem.38 It successfully exposes why 
the concept of territorial sovereignty justifies extraterritorial action, and how a general 
prohibition is inefficient, representing a turning point for advocates of the legality of non-
territorial based jurisdiction. The case in question extended the definition of control over 
                                                          
33 See ibid., p. 73 et seq. 
34 See MAIER, HAROLD G., p. 67. 
35 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 32 et seq. 
36 See MAIER, HAROLD G., p. 83 et seq. 
37 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 154. 
38 See Ibid., p. 38. 
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territory, including the concept of control over events that affect that territory. The 
extension of this notion separated the subjective theory of territorial jurisdiction from the 
objective, the latter embracing constituent effects.39 Furthermore, the Lotus case 
emphasized the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.40 
International law would permit jurisdiction to prescribe rules extraterritorially, but it 
would not allow its extraterritorial enforcement.  Following this line of thought, it’s 
correct to affirm that territorial sovereignty, in its traditional perspective, is directly linked 
with enforcement jurisdiction, but not with prescriptive.  
 
1.1.2. US’s contribution  
1.1.2.1. Effects’ doctrine 
The effects doctrine, first denoted in the Lotus case in 1927,41 and enacted by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Alcoa case in 1945, can also be of assistance 
to accentuate jurisdiction’s limits. This last case asserted United States’ power to apply 
its jurisdiction over foreign antitrust violations, provided that these have direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable domestic effects.42 This policy is applied when 
none of the constituting elements of the facts have taken place inside the State, still, the 
effects of facts occurred outside its borders, are felt within the State.43 Notwithstanding, 
there are authors who argue that jurisdiction will only be defendable if a constituent 
element of an act forbidden by law has occurred within a State’s territory, ensuing an 
analogy with criminal law. Akehurst argues that there are no substantial grounds to 
sustain the limitation, which would lead to breaches in the law.44 A set of facts may have 
effects on a different number of states, therefore it is imperative to classify effects as 
primary or secondary.45  
                                                          
39 See MEESSEN, KARL, Drafting Rules on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, p. 228 in Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in theory and practice (Meessen, Karl M. ed., London: Kluwer Law International. 1996); Maier, 
Harold G., p. 66. 
40 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 35. 
41 See MAIER, HAROLD G, p. 66.  
42 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 142. 
43 See BOWETT, D. W., Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources, p. 243 
in Jurisdiction in International Law (Reisman, Michael W. ed., Ashgate. 1999). 
44 See AKEHURST, MICHAEL, Jurisdiction in International Law, p. 75 et seq. in Jurisdiction in International 
Law (Reisman, Michael W. ed., Ashgate. 1999). 
45 See Ibid., p. 78 and 81. 
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The controversy of such doctrine is clear, as some states regard it as an overreach 
of jurisdiction.46 Additionally, the application of the effects doctrine, which is 
traditionally associated to criminal law, in the field of economic law, for example in 
antitrust matters, raises reservations.47 The statement from the case US v. Aluminum Co. 
of America perfectly explains the doctrine, “Any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences 
within its borders which the state reprehends.” Although the effects doctrine is infamous 
for being applied in the United States, it has been mentioned in antitrust European cases. 
In the Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. V. Commission of the European Communities, 
the Commission argued that jurisdiction based on effects was in accordance with 
international law.48  
 
1.1.2.2. Other States’ interests 
The obligation of considering Member States’ concurrent interests, introduced by 
American judgments as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America49 and Mannington 
Mills v. Congoleum Corporation, is not inherent to customary international law, at most, 
comity or courtesy are applied. Even US courts modified their view on the balancing of 
interests, in the case Laker Airways v. Sabena, the court stated that the reconciliation of 
conflicting interests was to be solved by diplomatic negotiations.50 Nevertheless, the 
respect for other states’ interests is still present in the Restatement.51 Maan critiques the 
concept of interests, as he perceives the doctrine nothing but a political consideration 
which does not meet the requirement of objectiveness.52 Harold G.Maier goes further and 
                                                          
46 See HIGGINS, ROSALYN, Allocating Competence: Jurisdiction, p. 285 in Jurisdiction in International Law 
(Reisman, Michael W. ed., Ashgate. 1999). 
47 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 199. 
48 See AKEHURST, MICHAEL, p. 77. 
49 Available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/timberlane_v._bank_of_america.pdf. 
50 See SHAW, MALCOM, p. 690. 
51 See Paragrah 402 (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed at 
the security of the state or against a limited class of other states interests and Paragrah 403 (3) When it 
would not be unreasonable for each of two States to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity , but the 
prescriptions from the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as 
other state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors , including those set at 
Subsection (2); a state should defer to other state’s if that state’s interest is clearly greater. 
52 See MAAN, FREDERICK A., p. 151. 
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articulates the reasoning behind the scepticism of such balance: who will proceed to do it 
and how will it be done?53 As it would be unreasonable for the balancing of interests to 
be made by the courts of one party,54 Paul Peters suggests independent courts or 
arbitrators as viable candidates to enact the balancing of interests, as national courts are 
most possibly unreliable to make such judgment.55 Europe is apprehensive about the 
concept of interest balancing since courts are not regarded as diplomats, and the 
discretionary power given by such method is uncharacteristic.  The Wood Pulp and 
Gencor cases demonstrate how uncomfortable Europe is with solving extraterritorial 
jurisdiction matters. A notion that is more probable of being acknowledged in Europe is 
connection. Interests can be defined as a common concern, linked with politics or 
business, on the contrary, connection presupposes a link or relationship.56  
 
1.1.2.3. The American Law Institution Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law 
Faced with several jurisdiction conflicts, with the aim of promoting clarification 
and simplification of law, the American Law Institute, in 1987 drafted the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law. The rule of reason is applicable to all fields of law, 
nevertheless, it has a deep link with antitrust cases. Section 403 of the latter combines 
principles of customary international law and comity to create a framework for analysing 
extraterritoriality cases.57 Most authors do not recognise the restatement as a rule of 
customary international law, however, in order to be perceived as so, there is no necessity 
for appliance by all states, but a lack of objection.58  
 Maan considers the rule of reason as being too open to be enacted at an 
international level, nonetheless, it considers it workable. Gary Born defends the 
                                                          
53 See MARTHA, RUTSEL SILVESTRE J., Extraterritorial Taxation in International Law, p. 85 in 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction in theory and practice (MEESSEN, KARL ed., London: Kluwer Law 
International. 1996). 
54 See BOWETT, D. W., p. 257. 
55 See MAIER, G. HAROLD, p. 157.  
56 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 165 et seq. 
57 See MAIER, G. HAROLD, p. 71. 
58 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 152 and 161. 
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restatement against opponents, by asserting that the rule of reason is considered too vague 
and ambiguous, because its evolutionary process is still enduring.59  
The introduction by the restatement of the limit of reasonableness, is to be 
commended. This concept functions as a limitation to overreaches of jurisdiction.60 
Paragraph 403 (1) introduces the notion, even when one of the basis for jurisdiction under 
§ 402 is fulfilled, that a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law, with respect 
to a person or activity having connections with another state, when the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is unreasonable. This requisite is only identified by analysing each case 
individually, still, paragraph 403 (2) indicates a non-exclusive list of aspects which may 
influence the interpretative process. The respect imposed by the fulfilment of this notion 
mirrors the comity principle.61  
The balancing obligation present in the Restatement, is not a new concept on 
international law, equity follows the same line of thought.62 Notwithstanding that a rule 
of reason has not been explicitly adopted by Europe, in the Eastern Aluminium case, a 
reasonableness criteria is to, some extent, utilized.63 
 
1.1.3. Protective principle 
Another basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction is the protective principle. Despite 
the fact that this principle is mainly applied in criminal law, the extension of it to other 
areas of law is in debate.64 The referred principle allows states to exercise jurisdiction 
over subjects who have committed an act abroad, which is deemed to be prejudicial to its 
territory. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is, consequently, admissible to protect states’ 
interests.65 This principle needs to be limited, similarly to the effects doctrine, solely 
primary effects should be considered.66  
 
 
                                                          
59 See MEESSEN, KARL, Drafting Rules on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, p. 247. 
60 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 153. 
61  See MAIER, G. HAROLD, p. 72. 
62 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 156. 
63 See ibid., p. 171. 
64 See BOWETT, D. W., p. 246. 
65 See SHAW, MALCOM, p. 667. 





1.1.4. Concept of substantial and genuine connection 
A truly demanding undertaking is to formulate a principle which outlines the 
extent of a State’s jurisdiction.67 Such model has to be capable of achieving a balance 
between certainty and adaptability.68 This challenging task raises uncertainties 
concerning extraterritoriality,69 and the legitimacy of the territoriality principle as the 
foundation of jurisdiction. There is no unanimity on how to define jurisdiction’s limits, 
still, currently, the fundamental question placed forward by authors is “if a sufficiently 
close connection is present between a given set of facts and a particular legal system”. 
Consequently, an assessment of reasonableness is required, with the weighing of legally 
significant elements, disregarding economic, social and political interests.70 Indeed, in 
recent years authors have stepped away from the notion of territoriality and moved closer 
to the idea of connection and reasonableness, which is presently the foundation of 
contemporary International Law,71 The levy of taxes outside the territory of a state has 
been accepted in customary international law, as long as there is a genuine connection 
between the State and the taxpayer, transaction or property.72  An association between the 
state and the fiscal subject or object of taxation is obligatory, determining the legality of 
fiscal jurisdiction.73  
 The significant connection doctrine does not exclude the existence of concurrent 
claims, the applicable standards, collected from state practice, will determine which of 
the claims has a stronger connection. This method differs from the balancing of interests 
concept, as state practice is a more reliable and objective source.74  
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court embraced the substantial and genuine 
                                                          
67 See MAAN, FREDERICK A., p. 146. 
68 See MAIER, HAROLD G., p. 89. 
69 See HIGGINS, ROSALYN, p. 283. 
70 See MAAN, FREDERICK A., p. 148. 
71 See HALPERN, JOSEPH, “Exorbitant Jurisdiction” and the Brussels Convention: Toward a Theory of 
Restraint, p. 478 et seq. in Extraterritorial jurisdiction in theory and practice (Meessen, Karl ed., London: 
Kluwer Law International. 1996); MAIER, HAROLD G., p. 90. 
72 See SHAW, MALCOM, p. 650 and AKEHURST, MICHAEL, p. 59. 
73 See MARTHA, RUTSEL SILVESTRE J., p. 23. 
74 See ibid., p. 91. 
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link doctrine, when it recognized the right for a State to tax depends on the existence of a 
reasonable link between the State and the person, property or transaction.75 
 
1.2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, regulates matters which do not have a territorial link 
with the State who claims to have authority. However, in most cases of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, some form of territorial link is present, even if not exclusive.76 The prospect 
of a state exercising prerogatives over facts or subjects outside its borders is, ironically, 
connected to the territoriality principle. In a time when physical borders slowly become 
irrelevant, an updated viewpoint of territory, and its ramifications, is imperative. What is 
desired is a characterisation of territorial jurisdiction closer to reality, and not the defence 
of unrestrained sovereignty.   
The foremost difficulty with extraterritoriality, is the lack of consensus on how to 
resolve the overlapping of concurrent jurisdictional claims. There is no recognized 
universal rule of conventional or customary international law distinct delimitation, and 
fragmentation of jurisdiction law is detrimental.77 Extraterritorial taxation problems are, 
occasionally, solved by double taxation treaties. Nevertheless, the absence of positive 
public international law governing jurisdiction to tax, contributes to the escalation of 
jurisdictional conflicts.78 In addition to criminal and antitrust matters, securities law is 
another field in which extraterritorial difficulties ensue.79  
 
1.3. Chapter’s conclusions 
This chapter scrutinized the fundamentals entailed to comprehend territoriality in 
the proposed directive, which will be contemplated in the succeeding pages.  Prior to 
analysing the territorial issues raised by the FTT, it was imperative to refer to the 
jurisdiction to tax, and its territorial boundaries.  As I have highlighted previously, there 
is no consensus on the delineation of territorial jurisdictions’ boundaries. The inexistence 
                                                          
75 See MAAN, FREDERICK A., p. 149; CHRISTIAN TIEJ, JURGEN BERING AND TOBIAS ZUBER, Und 
Europarechliche Zulassigkeit Extraterntorialer Anknupfung einer Finanztransaktionsseuer, (Heft 129. 
2014) p. 8; Case BverfGE 63 343 (369).   
76 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 20. 
77 See MAIER, HAROLD G., p. 100. 
78 See ibid., p. 20 et seq. 
79 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 327. 
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of a centralized international legal system fuels, even further, the issue in question. There 
are some internationally recognized principles, as the protective and non-intervention, 
which contribute to the paradigm, still, they are not sufficient to successfully resolve the 
territorial concerns. For that reason, a panoply of doctrines were created in order to 
respond to the problem. The Classical International Law Doctrine was challenged by the 
infamous Lotus Case, which acknowledged a less restrict notion of tax jurisdiction. The 
United States of America are notorious for its overstretched model of prerogatives, 
consequently, it is expected that an abundant amount of progresses should follow, in this 
territorial matter, with origins in that country. Although the European Union does not 
explicitly acknowledge those doctrines, they contribute to the enrichment of the debate, 
and may be employed as the basis for a solution. The existence of a substantial and 
genuine connection is appointed as the most adequate doctrine to resolve the dispute of 



























The proposed directive has been looked upon with scepticism, and controversy 
regarding the legality of its territorial scope and its administrative feasibility has arisen. 
The matter of disagreement is its overreach of jurisdiction enabled by the tax triggering 
factors. The previous chapter elected the genuine connection as the best criterion to 
legitimate tax jurisdiction. With that paradigm in mind, this chapter aims to reflect upon 
the territoriality of FTT in four distinct perspectives with the objective of substantiating 
the legality of the proposal and practical viability.  
Specifically, in order to achieve an adequate legal and practical analysis it is 
imperative to further understand the proposed directive in two other perspectives. The 
rationale behind including a structural and economic perspective is to achieve a full 
comprehension of the background and the motives behind the design of the proposed tax. 
Subsequent to grasping how the tax works, and why those policy options were made, the 
focus turns to the legality of those choices, considered in the legal perspective. Finally, 
the practical perspective aims at understanding the administrative achievability of a tax 
with such an extensive territorial scope.   
 
2.2. Structural Perspective 
 The success of a tax on financial transactions relies upon the decision of which 
factor should trigger the taxable event.80 The 2011 proposal was centred in the application 
of a broadly-defined residence principle associated with the taxation of the counterparty 
to the transaction. The original proposal, which was already sensible to the phenomenon 
of relocation, was altered after the number of participating Member States was reduced. 
This policy can be by justified by the necessity to contradict tax avoidance, the lower the 
number of countries which implement the tax, the higher is the risk of substitution 
behaviour and relocation of activities. Complementing the connecting factor of residence 
                                                          
80 See LENDVAI, JULIA, RACIBORSKI, RAFAL AND VOGEL, LUKAS, Macroeconomic Impact of Financial 
Transaction Taxes, p. 198 in Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector (Ruud de Mooij and Gaëtan 
Nicodème eds., CESifo seminar series. 2014). 
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with the issuance principle was regarded as a reinforcement of the primary proposal.81  
 
2.1.1. The residence and counterparty principle  
 According to the residence principle, once a territorial link is found between the 
financial institution part of the transaction and a participating member-state, that 
institution is deemed to be established in the latter, and as a result is liable to pay FTT. 
Daniel Shaviro regards the use of residence as the basis of the FTT, rather than source-
based jurisdiction, as one of its strongest features.82 The list of conditions present in 
Article 4 (1) is hierarchical. If more than one condition is fulfilled, the first condition met 
is the relevant one for determining establishment. Oskar Henkow argues that the 
authorization, registered seat and branches connecting factors are easily detectable. The 
authorization and seat settings, do not necessarily, correctly, reflect where the activity of 
the institution is primarily carried out, manipulation of those connecting factors is 
possible. The third connecting factor refers to the permanent address or usual residence 
which has to be understood as the domicile of the company, when it does not coincide 
with the registered seat.83  
The last connecting factor is the counterparty principle, which goes further than 
any other. The other part of the financial transaction, if not deemed to be established 
within the FTT-Zone, neither by the residence or the issuance principle, will be deemed 
to be established in the same participating member-state as the part which has been 
deemed established.84 As a consequence of the application of this principle, the other part 
of the transaction will be taxed in the same conditions as the part which has been 
established in the FTT-zone. The key concept in discussion is “sufficient link”. The 
legality of the counterparty principle will be examined later in this study, in the legal 
perspective sector.  
                                                          
81 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, p. 5; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact Assessment, 
proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial 
Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, p. 40 and 43. 
82 See SHAVIRO, DANIEL, The Financial Transactions Tax vs the Financial Activities Tax, p. 172 in Taxing 
the Financial Sector Financial taxes, Bank Levies and more (Marres, Otto and Weber, Dennis eds., IBFD. 
2012). 
83 See HENKOW, OSKAR, p. 15. 
84 See Article 4 (1) (f)) of the Proposed Directive.  
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2.1.2. The issuance principle  
The issuance principle can be applied in different manners, in other words, with 
different connecting factors. For securities and similar instruments (denominated in the 
directive, as “financial instruments”, which include transferable securities, money-market 
instruments, and units in collective investment undertakings),85 the definition of issuance 
is straightforward: as mentioned in the directive, a financial instrument issued within the 
territory of a participating Member State means “such financial instrument that is issued 
by a person who has its registered seat or, in case of a natural person, its permanent 
address or, if no permanent address can be ascertained, its usual residence in that State;”.86 
Financial instruments always have a substantial link with their issuing State, 
consequently, no objections to the legality of this principle are expected.87 For 
derivatives, one of the options is establishing as connecting factor the legal seat of the 
issuer of the underlying security. A second option, which has been adopted by the 
proposal,88 is according to the place of transaction, this option only includes instruments 
                                                          
85 See Article 2 n1 (11) and Section C of annex I of directive 2004/39/EC.  
86 See Article 2 n1 (11) from the proposed Directive.  
87 See TIETJE, BERING AND ZUBER, VOLKER, p. 24. 
88 See Article 4 (1) (g) of the Proposed Directive. 
18 
 
which are traded on an organised platform. Both alternatives possess weak spots, the first 
can raise legal issues, if one believes there is not a sufficient nexus for the taxation of 
derivatives. The second leaves untouched all instruments which are not negotiated in an 
organized platform, for instance over the counter derivatives. In order to understand the 
functioning of this principle an example is described. A transaction between a non-
participating Member State and a Third Country involving shares issued by a Portuguese 















2.1.4. Cumulative application of principles 
The proposal put forward by the commission establishes a cumulative application 
of both the residence and the issuance principles. In such way that, if no counterparty is 
deemed to be established in the FTT-Zone, but shares issued in that zone are 
bought/sold/exchanged, they will be subject of taxation.  
The proposed directive can be characterised as broad-based. Its wide scope is felt 
on the financial institutions it covers (actors), on the financial instruments which are 
potentially taxed and in the establishment of tax jurisdiction. The latter issue has been the 
key focus of the proposal. Tax jurisdiction is, and will most likely always be, a sensitive 
matter. Non-participating Member-States and Third countries are deeply concerned about 
the effects of the implementation of an FTT on their jurisdictions, namely on its 
















2.2. Economic Perspective 
2.2.1. Substitution behaviour and relocation 
 The introduction of a financial transaction tax increases the cost of each 
transaction. Investors may adopt one of four conducts: continue trading and pay the tax, 
change the location of the trade, trade non-taxed financial instruments or don’t trade at 
all.89 The financial sector is characterized by its extraordinary capability of innovation 
and mobility.90 Tax avoidance and tax planning prospects must be taken into account in 
the design of any tax, particularly one which targets such an elusive sector. Consequently, 
FTT was conceived with the hazard of substitution behaviour in mind. Being able to 
prevent this conduct will assure the success of the tax, and guarantee its purposes are 
reached. Substitution may occur concerning actors, for instance with the utilization of 
financial institutions outside the scope of the tax, or regarding financial instruments, by 
choosing to trade untaxed assets. Furthermore, substitution behaviour may materialize in 
cross-border migration of trade, otherwise acknowledged as delocalization. Tax design 
was essential to avert the occurrence of geographical relocation of transactions in the 
proposed tax, undermining its enactment.  
 
                                                          
89 See SCHULMEISTER, ET AL, p. 23. 
90 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, p. 2. 
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2.2.1.1. Tax rates  
The idea behind the FTT is that very low tax rates will not incentive relocation,91 
still, this measure would have not been enough to prevent such occurrence. Once it 
became clear that a financial tax at a European level was unattainable, amendments had 
to be made to the 2011’s proposal. With the partaking of fewer Member-States, and 
geographical coverage being narrower, replacement conducts proliferate, therefore 
justifying the introduction of the issuance principle.92 The impact assessment states that 
the introduction of such principle will aid at combating evasion and relocation by 
widening the scope of the tax by 10%.93 This addition, allied with very low tax rates, a 
broad-scope, the anti-abuse clause and the residence principle contribute to the design of 
a relocation-proof tax. The tax can merely be evaded by financial organizations which no 
longer wish to operate in the EU market.94 The risk of operations shifting is minor, since 
taxation relies upon the identity of the parties and characterization of the tradable assets, 
not on where the transaction takes place.95  
The impact assessment advocates the enactment of standard rates instead of 
minimum rates to avoid tax planning opportunities amongst the participating member-
states.96 Another proposed measure to combat relocation is the use of differentiated tax 
rates, according to products’ mobility. Nevertheless, some authors note that this approach 
may rise collection costs, reduce revenues and possibly produce distortions between the 
different products.97  
                                                          
91 See HEMMELGARN, T., AND NICODEME, G., The 2008 Financial Crisis and Taxation Policy, Centre Emile 
Bernheim, Working Paper No. 10/006 (2010) p. 145.  
92 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, p. 5; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact Assessment, 
proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial 
Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, p. 18. 
93 See ibid., p. 40. 
94 See ibid., p. 4. 
95 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FTT Non-technical Answers to Some Questions on Core Features and 
Potential Effects, p. 6. 
96 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction 
tax, p. 5; European Commission, Impact Assessment, proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, 
p. 17. 




2.2.1.2 Broad-based tax 
The design of a broad-based tax constitutes another adequate approach in 
combating tax avoidance. The proposed tax addresses an extensive list of actors, markets 
and financial instruments. The inclusion of derivatives in the scope of the tax is to be 
commended. These opaque instruments are extensively perceived as having helped 
generate the financial crisis, as they allow taxpayers to increase the separation between 
their economic fundaments, and the tax system’s interpretation of their actions. Tax 
treatment asymmetry, inconsistency and imbalance, follow as the result of derivatives and 
tax opportunities provided by these instruments must be taken into account.98 If the 
residence principle is applied to all shares, national and foreign, provided they are traded 
by at least one resident institution, then all derivatives on shares, independently of 
whether or not the underlying shares are national or foreign, should also be taxed. It is a 
matter of equality and symmetry in tax policy. 
 
2.3. Legal Perspective  
2.3.1. The Council’s legal service opinion99  
 Besides the disapproval from non-participating Member States and Third 
Countries, the legal services of the council has made public a document expressing their 
doubts regarding the extended territorial scope of the FTT.  
According to the document in question, Article 4 (1) (f) of the proposed directive, 
imposing FTT on financial institutions resident in non-participating Member States 
(counterparty principle), surpasses jurisdiction for taxation under international customary 
law.100 The legal services identify the necessity of a relevant link between the State which 
exercises jurisdiction, and the person or situation over which jurisdiction is exercised. 
This link needs to be validated by pertinent policy objectives. For that matter, the revenue-
raising aim of an FTT, is not considered strong enough to corroborate a remote nexus for 
taxation. Likewise, the need for the financial sector to subsidize the costs of the crisis, in 
the opinion of the legal services, does not justify such connection. The tax will target 
                                                          
98 See ibid., p. 184. 
99 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Opinion of the legal service, Proposal for a Council Directive 
Implementing Enhanced cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, Legality of the 
Counterparty-based Deemed Establishment of Financial Institutions (2013). 
100 See Article 3 (5) TEU. 
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financial institutions and instruments which have not contributed to the development of 
the crisis, and if they had contributed, revenues collected from taxation, would be entitled 
to the States where they are established. The proposed tax will affect not only risky 
activities, but also activities which do not generate systemic risk. Therefore such objective 
cannot, also, substantiate the legitimacy of a distant connection.101 Lastly, the 
counterparty principle may not be justified by being an anti-fraud or anti-evasion 
measure, as it does not comply with the proportionality principle.102 
The counterparty principle is characterized as being discriminatory. As a result of 
its functioning, participating Member States will not only tax their own financial 
institutions, but also financial institutions established in Non-participating Member States 
and Third Countries. The same will not occur if a transaction takes places between two 
Participating Member States. The legal services state that, the two situations described 
are identical from a territorial point of view, though are treated differently, solely, because 
a State did not agree to participate in enhanced cooperation.103 Moreover, double taxation 
is avoided within the FTT-zone, but there is no double tax relief for non-participating 
Member States and Third Countries, which will have to deal with higher costs.  As a result 
of the counterparty principle, financial institutions established outside the FTT-zone will 
be submitted to 11 different tax rates, depending of who they are contracting with.104 
Additionally discriminatory, according to the legal services, is the fact that joint liability 
is less likely to occur, when two financial institutions established in the FTT-zone 
contract, then when the counterparty is a financial institution which is not established in 
the FTT-zone. Participating Member States entitled to the tax, are unlikely to be unable 
to enforce payment on an institution established in their own territory. These premises are 
likely to influence capital movements.105 
The recovery of taxes from financial institutions established in non-participating 
Member States is easier, due to the obligation of providing mutual assistance, than from 
financial institutions established in Third-countries. This, can result in distortions of 
                                                          
101 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Opinion of the legal service, Proposal for a Council Directive 
Implementing Enhanced cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, Legality of the 
Counterparty-based Deemed Establishment of Financial Institutions, p. 7. 
102 See ibid., p. 8. 
103 See ibid., p. 9.  
104 See ibid., p. 10.  
105 See ibid., p. 11.  
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competition and capital movement.106 The latter freedom is also considered, by the legal 
services of the council, to be under restriction as a consequence of FTT. The Counterparty 
principle makes financial transactions with financial institutions located outside the 
participating Member States less attractive, as these financial institutions are subjected to 
11 different tax rates, which generates legal uncertainty, and due to joint liability, which 
may cause disputes with tax authorities.107 
 Article 4 (1) (g) is critiqued by the Legal Services for, once again, being regarded 
as extraterritorial, exceeding the Union’s legislative jurisdiction. The Wood Pulp case is 
referred at this point, the automatic character of the issuance principle does not permit an 
individual analysis of cases. The critique is extended to the substance over form clause 
present at Article 4 (3). This escape clause is regarded as unsatisfactory.108 
 Article 327 TFEU, the basis of enhanced cooperation, states that enhanced 
cooperation should respect the competences, rights and obligations of member states who 
choose not to partake. Defending non-participating States’ option to adopt their own tax 
systems.109 The Legal Services of the Council, regard the fact that FTT will still burden 
Member States who choose not to participate a violation of Article 327 TFEU. Even with 
double taxation relief, non-participating Member States will still contribute to the budget 
of participating Member States, while the contrary will not happen.110 
  
2.3.2. Non-paper by the Commission Services111  
The Commissions services released a response to the document analysed 
previously, emphasizing the legality of the proposal.  
The Commission services agrees with the statement that customary international 
law must be complied with, the treaties dispositions must be respected and all points of 
                                                          
106 See Article 56 to 66 TFEU. 
107 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Opinion of the legal service, Proposal for a Council 
Directive Implementing Enhanced cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, Legality of the 
Counterparty-based Deemed Establishment of Financial Institutions, p. 13. 
108 See ibid., p. 8. 
109 See ibid., p. 11. 
110 See ibid., p. 12. 
111 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction 
tax, Response to the Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council on the Legality of the Counterparty-based 
Deemed Establishment of Financial Institutions, Non-paper by the Commission Services (2013). 
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article 327 TFEU must be fulfilled in order for enhanced cooperation to be applied. 
Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by the Legal Services of the Council are 
unfounded and inapplicable.112 
When establishing tax jurisdiction one may rely on two principles - nationality 
(personality) and territoriality. Territoriality, also includes events that, even by not taking 
place inside the territory of a Member-State, will still have an effect on it. When 
establishing if there is a territorial connection, the Council Legal Services asks the wrong 
question "Do other states have a more relevant interest in regulating the taxpayer's 
conduct then the Participating Member-State?”. Indeed, the right question is: "is there 
sufficient nexus to justify the exercise of taxing jurisdiction by the Participating Member-
State?”. It appears there is a misunderstanding between "nexus", and the interests of other 
states.113 The American Law Institute does not consider interest as a requirement of 
international law. A clear example is that on paragraph 403 the word may is used: "a state 
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having 
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable". 
Therefore other States' interests are merely taken into consideration in an ambience of 
mutual courtesy and respect between nations. Even though another States' interest are not, 
a valid limitation to tax jurisdiction, it does not signify that there are no limitations. The 
right criteria is the connection.114 Fiscal attachment may be personal or economic. 
Examples of personal connection factors are domicile, residence or citizenship of 
individuals, and the place of incorporation or of effective management of legal entities. 
On the other hand, an economic attachment is born when a transaction or activity is 
connected to the territory of a State.115 A good example of the latter is placed forward by 
paragraph 402 (4) " a state may exercise jurisdiction to tax a transaction that occurs, 
originates or terminates in its territory or that has a substantial relation to the state without 
regard to the nationality, domicile, residence ore presence of the parties to such a 
transaction". This paragraph provides legal grounds for the counterparty principle. 
Furthermore, as stated by the Commissions’ legal services, the counterparty principle 
only applies if there is an actual connecting factor, in other words, if the counterparty is 
                                                          
112 See ibid., p. 3.  
113 See ibid., p. 4.  
114 See ibid., p. 5.  
115 See ibid., p. 6.  
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deemed to be established in a participating Member State. Only if one of the situations 
described by article 4 (1) (a) to (e) is fulfilled.116 Certainly, in all cross-border financial 
transactions there is a connection between the non-participating Member State or third 
country, with the participating Member-state. By negotiating with the participating 
Member-State an economic attachment is established, placing the non-participating 
Member-State or third country under its tax jurisdiction. A great example of the 
imposition of tax jurisdiction is, in fact, the UK’s stamp duty, as it applies to the transfer 
of shares linked to the UK, even if the parties of the transaction are both resident outside 
the UK.117 Besides, the proposed directive answers the concerns of an insufficient nexus 
by the inclusion of an escape clause, making it clear that the proposed directive does not 
intend to disrespect other Member States’ jurisdiction. It is therefore incomprehensive, in 
the opinion of the services of the commission, the criticism to Article 4 (3).118 The 
services of the commission believe the legal services of the Council have a restricted, and 
incorrect concept of territoriality, which is shown by the reference to the Wood Pulp case 
and by assertions regarding the greater interest of other States. 
The Commission’s services, likewise, state that all requisites of the application of 
enhanced corporation are fulfilled. The Non-participant Member-State's liberty to create 
and maintain taxes on financial transactions remains untouched. Furthermore, concerning 
double taxation, it will occur if Non-Participating Member States have an FTT of their 
own. Still, that is not a reason to discredit the adoption of a harmonized FTT, on the 
contrary, it should be viewed as a reason for its implementation. Then again, double 
taxation is not banned within the European Union, and is a recurring problem, the 
standard solutions should be applied. Customary International Law does not avert the 
intersection of different national tax jurisdictions.119 Furthermore, the Commissions 
services emphasize that "The tax does not create a burden for the financial markets of the 
non-participating Member States, but only for the activities of the financial institutions 
affecting the market of the participating Member State.”.120 
The Council's Legal Services is alarmed about Article 4 (1) (f) only applying to 
financial institutions which are not established in participating member states, qualifying 
                                                          
116 See ibid., p. 8. 
117 See ibid., p. 9.  
118 See ibid., p. 10.  
119 See ibid., p. 13.  
120 See ibid., p. 14 
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the article in question as a discrimination or as a barrier to the free movement of capital 
or the freedom to provide services. In the Commission’s opinion there is in both situations 
two FTT claims, the fact that there is a mechanism for the allocation of taxing rights 
between participating Member-States cannot be considered a discriminating measure. 
Moreover, the fact that non-participating Member-States and third countries may be 
subjected to 11 different rates cannot, likewise, be viewed as discriminatory. Once again, 
this is a recurring problem within the European Union, which is present for example in 
the VAT Directive.121 Regarding the enforcement of payment, it has been recognized by 
the CJEU the difficulty of collecting taxes in cross-border situations and the high risk it 
evolves, consequently joint liability cannot be perceived as a discriminatory measure. If 
it is so, then again, so it would be the case with Articles 193 to 205 of the VAT Directive.  
The allegations of distortion of competition are quickly placed aside by the 
Commissions’ services, by reminding the Council Legal Services that the alleged 
distortions are outside the scope of Article 326 TFEU.122 The argument that the 
implementation of an FTT may create an obstacle to the free movement of capital, has to 
be answered with a detailed analysis, which is not done by the Commissions’ services. 
The services simply state that any tax on cross-border activity cannot, automatically, be 
considered an obstacle.123 
 
2.3.3. Further premises in support of the proposed Directive: Critical analysis. 
The financial sector and its trading activity, unsurprisingly cause effects which 
transverse various states. Accordingly, extraterritorial jurisdiction in this field can derive 
from a loosely assembled territoriality principle. The territorial Principle, perceived as the 
foundation of sovereignty, has adapted itself to accommodate to the existence of mobile 
things like ships and aircrafts.124 My question is, why can’t it adjust to the existence of 
cross-border transactions? Furthermore, the acceptance of unitary taxation contributes to 
the affirmation of legality of a tax on financial transactions. 
 
 
                                                          
121 See ibid., p. 16. 
122 See ibid., p. 17. 
123 See ibid., p. 18.  
124 See BOWETT, D. W., p. 240. 
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2.3.3.1. Customary International Law 
Customary International law, and general principles of law, are a primary source 
for international tax law, which deals with tax conflicts concerning cross-border 
transactions. There are two doctrines on jurisdiction to tax, one believes in no limitations 
to the State’s right to tax, while the other argues that jurisdiction to tax is restricted by 
territory.  The two schools of thought have different perceptions of State sovereignty. 
Although a consensus is not reached on the existence or non-existence of restrictions, 
there is consensus on the relevance of connecting factors. One of the recognized 
connecting factors is the existence of an economic attachment, due to the development of 
an economic activity. An entity, though not resident, is present in the taxing country in 
some meaningful way.125  
The FTT’s counterparty principle’s legality is the centre of the controversy, as it 
is understood, by some, as having an extraterritorial effect, inconsistent with international 
law. International customary law, as established before, sets the limit of relevant or 
sufficient link. This limit is considered, by opponents of the tax, to be disrespected by the 
FTT. The mentioned doctrine does not consist of a strict rule, as the globalised and 
interdependent economy requires a certain amount of adaptability and ambiguity. 
Consequently, an interpretative case-by-case analysis is obligatory in order to establish 
the existence, or non-existence, of a significant connection. The Article in question 
requires a territorial connection with the FTT-zone, as it is only applicable if one of the 
parties of the transaction is deemed to be established in a participating Member State. The 
true question is if being in a transaction with a participating Member-State is sufficient to 
acknowledge a genuine connection with the taxing state. In my view, it is. The 
establishment of a part of the transaction within the FTT-zone, attributes jurisdiction 
concerning the whole transaction. The two parties and the transaction constitute one fact, 
taxable by the participating Member State. In tax law, especially when dealing with cross-
border transactions, an economic affiliation is enough to justify the right to tax. Further, 
it should not be forgotten that legislative jurisdiction, as established in chapter 1, is 
competitive by nature, and not exclusive.126 In addition, other methods which designate 
States’ jurisdiction, described in Chapter 1, can be employed to corroborate the legality 
of the provision.  
                                                          
125 See ROHATGI, ROY, p. 11 et seq. 
126 See TIETJE/BERING/ZUBER p. 21 and 22. 
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In particular, the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, introduces the view that a state may exercise 
jurisdiction based on two criteria: either a personal or territorial link between the entity 
and the transaction exists, or there is an economic connection, in the sense that a 
transaction affects the territory of the State, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. The 
latter method of establishing jurisdiction, likewise, corroborates the legality of the 
counterparty principle. The 2008 deep economic crisis, uncovered the consequences of 
under taxed and unregulated financial markets.  FTT’s proposed Directive was assembled 
with the aim, amongst others, of correcting markets’ behaviour. These objectives are 
accomplished by the tax treatment of transactions. Transactions which fall within the 
scope of this directive have, besides a territorial connection, an economic link with the 
participating Member State claiming jurisdiction, as their effects, positive or negative, 
will be felt, not exclusively but nonetheless, within its borders.  
The protective principle is an acknowledged norm of international law. It 
recognizes the possibility of a State to assert authority over events even though they do 
not take place within its territorial scope. The intervention of the State must be justified 
by a domestic interest deserving protection and is required to be reasonable. Even though 
this principle is traditionally mainly used in criminal law, the ECJ has been applying it to 
anti-trust law, with the purpose of protecting the internal market.127  Notwithstanding I 
do not consider the counterparty principle to entail an extraterritorial measure, if it did, 
the referred principle would easily be applicable. The correction of market’s entities toxic 
behaviour and subsequently reaching an equilibrium of the financial sector, are eligible 
domestic interests deserving protection.128 The 2008 crisis exemplified remarkably the 
importance of having a healthy financial sector to the general world economy.  I agree 
with Higgins, on the necessity of adopting a flexible approach to solving jurisdiction 
matters, especially when the protection of common values, like the stabilization of 
financial markets, is in question.129 
 
2.3.3.2. Distortion and Proportionality  
Proportionality of the measure, when compared to its objectives, is placed in 
                                                          
127 See Wood Pulp and Ahlstrom case.  
128 See TIETJE/BERING/ZUBER p. 28 and 29. 
129 See HIGGINS, ROSALYN, p. 288. 
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question by FTT’s antagonists. The principle of proportionality requires a measure to be 
of an adequate size or degree to the objective it is pursuing.130 Besides curbing excessive 
financial market volatility, stabilizing markets and raising revenues, coordinated action 
in this matter contributes to European integration, therefore, assertion of 
disproportionality is unfounded.  
Moreover, the claim of Article’s 327 TFEU violation is likewise unsubstantiated. 
Non-participating Member States are still able to maintain or adopt their own taxes 
targeting the financial market. The existence of an overlap is a common phenomenon in 
the European Union as full integration is not yet accomplished. Double taxation 
agreements should, in principle, be sufficient to resolve such occurrence.  
 
2.3.3.3. Free Movement of Capital 
An FTT is to be enacted in the European capital markets, therefore, it is imperative 
to comprehend if it will have a negative impact in the European free movement of capital, 
or in other freedoms. When analysing an incompatibility with the four fundamental 
freedoms there are four steps that should be taken. The court's test comes down to 
fundamentally the following rule of reason assessment: does the tax measure concerned 
differentiate between cross-border situation and the analogous domestic situation 
jeopardizing the exercise of free movement? If so, is that defensible by a valid purpose? 
If so, does the obstructing effect not go beyond what is required to reach that reasonable 
aim?131  
The first step is to identify which of the four fundamental freedoms might be 
affected. Is the FTT within the scope of the free movement of capital or/and the free 
movement of services? There is no consensus on the definition of capital movement. The 
CJEU resolves this problem with a causality method. For each case, the link between the 
two freedoms and the contested tax measure must be analysed, in order to understand 
which of the freedoms is directly impacted by the proposed measure. In this case I believe 
the freedom of providing services is only impacted secondarily, hence the FTT should 
fall under the scope of the free movement of capital.132  
The second step, on the followed approach, is to understand if the tax measure 
                                                          
130 See RYNGOERT, CEDRIC, p. 157. 
131 See J.M. BEN AND WATTEL, TERRA PETER J., European tax law (Kluwer. 2012) p. 45. 
132 See ibid., p. 126 et seq. 
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constitutes a restriction, discriminatory or non-discriminatory. The allocation of fiscal 
jurisdiction does not allow Member States to apply measures contrary to the fundamental 
freedoms.133 In the present case, is there a discrimination or a restriction? The distinction 
is not always very clear. According to João Nogueira Pinto Félix discrimination invokes 
the idea of equality, it compares two situations which are equal in all aspects except for 
one. On the other hand, there is no need for the comparability test in a restriction.134 A 
discriminatory measure presupposes transnational investment is treated less favourably 
than a parallel domestic investment. A restriction thus exists if the tax simply dissuades 
transnational trade. The FTT cannot be considered a discriminatory tax, contrary to what 
opponents believe, as it is applied to all financial institutions, established in a Member 
State and their counter-party. There is no distinction made between the transactions which 
occur domestically and transnationally. It can, hence, be concluded that the tax is not 
discriminatory.135 By exempting spot currency transactions, the FTT has left untouched 
the free movement of capital. Even though the proposed directive cannot be understood 
as discriminatory, can it be considered restrictive? There are authors that consider the 
implementation of an FTT a restriction to high-volume and low-margin transactions.136 
My view is that, while an FTT will influence markets participants’ behaviour, it cannot 
be perceived as a restriction. The additional costs an FTT implicates are present in the 
implementation of any tax, if one considers the proposed directive as restrictive, shouldn’t 
all taxes which aim at correcting economic behaviour be also perceived as such? Still, if 
the tax in question is considered restrictive, it will, nevertheless, be reasonably defensible.  
According to established case law, a measure which is apt to limit the freedom of 
establishment is allowable. Nevertheless, it has to pursue a legitimate objective, be 
compatible with the Treaty, and be justifiable by overruling reasons of public interest. 
This is the third step in the courts’ judgment, known as the “rule of reason”. Concerning 
the free movement of capital, the written justification grounds are found in Article 65 (1) 
(b) of TFEU. The question is if the FTT involves a fundamental interest of society and 
therefore can be justified by the article in question. If one considers it does not, then there 
                                                          
133 See de Groot, paragraph 94; Renneberg, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Beker, paragraphs 33 and 34. 
134 See NOGUEIRA, JOÃO FÉLIX PINTO, Direito fiscal Europeu: o Paradigma da Proporcionalidade: a 
Proporcionalidade como Critério Central da Compatibilidade de Normas Tributárias Internas com as 
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is still the possible application of the rule of reason. In my perspective, the purpose of 
preventing future financial crisis by the correction of financial markets behaviour is a 
reasonable objective. Within this last step there are three sub-steps, its application must 
be suitable to guarantee the accomplishment of the objective thus pursued, and not go 
past what is necessary to attain it.137 Alternative measures were available to correct 
market’s conducts, however, it is not up to the CJEU to decide which measure is better 
well-suited. The court may merely decide if the FTT is a suitable measure, which most 
certainly is. Furthermore, it is in this last step where proportionality comes into action. 
This concept is used systematically as a guide in the court’s reasoning. Proportionality 
can be understood in two different outlooks, a positive one or a negative one.138  When 
the ECJ employs the negative perspective, proportionality is employed as a control 
element. Further, I note that according to Daniel S. Smit, the proportionality test obliges 
for a balance test between the objective pursued by the policy, and the taxpayer’s 
interests.139 Lastly, the FTT passes the test of proportionality, as the objective pursued 
has the taxpayer’s best-interests in mind.  
 
2.4. Practical Perspective 
 The preceding perspectives focused predominantly on the territorial design of 
the tax. Even though the European Commission did not explicitly mention the collection 
of the tax, the demonstration of administrative feasibility of any tax is fundamental to its 
implementation, hence the inevitability of including this perspective in the dissertation. 
There are several complex factors to take into account with tax collection, still, this 
perspective will only cover the territorial aspect of collection, and the difficulties a 
broad territorial scope may imply.  
 The implementation and execution of a tax on the financial sector, known for its 
creative, fast-passed, dynamic atmosphere, is of extreme administrative intricacy. Even 
so, such complexity is not exclusive to FTT.140 According to the IMF, an FTT presents 
no more tax administration difficulties than other taxes, in some aspects it is actually 
                                                          
137 See de Lasteyrie du Saillant, paragraph 49; Case C 446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I 10837, 
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138 See NOGUEIRA, JOÃO FÉLIX PINTO p. 81 et seq. 
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easier.141 The tax will be employed progressively, with the primary exemption of certain 
actors, instruments and markets. The impact assessment argues that the phasing in of a 
common system, even though necessary, may have negative effects.142 Tax collection is 
not regulated in detail in the proposed directive. By only scripting the basic rules and 
framework,143 the participating Member States are given a high level of discretion.144 
Nonetheless, a harmonised approach to collection would have advantages.145 
 The proposed FTT is regarded as impractical by many actors due to the extensive 
territorial scope it entails. The territorial scope extension would not be perceived as a 
problem if there was European harmonization in this matters, even more if the tax was to 
be implemented at a global scale. If it was so, every Nation would direct its efforts 
towards a successful collection of the tax. Neither a European nor globalized 
harmonization was possible, as only 11 European countries have committed to the 
implementation of this tax. Nonetheless, collection complications would diminish if the 
counterparty principle was not included in the proposed directive. With the application of 
the counterparty principle the other part of the transaction will be taxed in the same 
conditions as the part which has been established in the FTT-zone. The other part is 
established in a non-participating Member-State or in a Third Country, therefore, it is 
sensible to presume that such countries will have objections to the taxation of their 
national financial institutions, especially as they will not be entitled to the revenues. 
Furthermore, counterparty identification may prove to be difficult.146 Participating 
Member States have limited tools to enforce compliance, still, the configuration of 
regulatory reporting and the maintenance of tax collection accessible, simple and clear, 
may help. The transfer of information between participating member states and non-
                                                          
141 See BRONDOLO, JOHN D., Taxing Financial Transactions: An Assessment of Administrative 
Feasibility, IMF Working paper (2011) p. 5. 
142 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Impact Assessment, proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction tax, Analysis of Policy Options and Impacts, 
p. 43. 
143 Article 11 of the Proposed Directive. 
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participating member states tax authorities and the mutual assistance mechanisms in 
place147 will greatly influence the practical feasibility of this tax. 
 The proposed European FTT is gutsier than any other tax enacted on the financial 
sector, especially taking in mind its broad-scope and territorial reach.148 As there is no 
experience in collecting a tax on financial markets with such a broad territorial scope a 
comparative analysis with other countries is inadequate.  The last statement does not 
apply to the issuance principle, which is already applied successfully by the UK.  
 A safety net is generated by the inclusion of joint liability, which permits a 
participating Member State to collect the tax from the counterparty in case the primarily 
liable financial institution does not timely pay.149 The payment of tax by both sides of the 
transaction, as well as being excellent for revenue-raising is, likewise, an exceptional 
measure for tax-collection purposes, as it allows a comparative control to be made. An 
important aid in monitoring the collection of revenue is Article 25 (2) of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive, as it prescribes the obligation of institutions to maintain 
relevant data on all transactions of financial instruments, including OTC.150  
Exchange-traded instruments will be more easily affected by FTT, this is because 
they are traded in an organized platform. Over-the-counter derivatives present the greatest 
tax-collection difficulties. Difficulties include establishing the territorial coverage of the 
tax, defining the taxable event, measuring the tax base, identifying the taxable persons 
and assessing and collecting the tax. All of the latter identified difficulties must be taken 
into consideration in FTT’s design. OTC markets are less formal, where transactions are 
negotiated by two parties, one of whom is usually a dealer. These markets are known for 
their lack of transparency.151 Moreover, OTC markets are extremely diverse among 
themselves. For OTC instruments which are negotiated in an organized platform, the 
                                                          
147 A reference must be made to Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative co-operation 
in the field of taxation and to mutual assistance in recovery obligations under Council Directive 2010/24/EU 
of 16 March 2010. Also, to ensure the compliance of Third countries’ tax authorities the Council of 
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clearinghouse would charge the tax to the two counterparties and remit the revenue raised 
to the government. On the contrary, instruments dealt outside clearinghouses’, where the 
counterparties are dealers or brokers, or other major market participants, the two 
counterparties should be charged half-and-half. Using dealers for collection purposes 
simplifies and reduces administrative costs. For OTC transactions, where an end-user is 
part of, an exemption should be in place.152 
Even though the exclusion of the issuance and counterparty principle, and the 
consequent reduction of geographic scope, would significantly ease tax collection, it 
would also inhibit the achievement of the purpose of this tax. Tax policy has to take into 
consideration the implementation phase and administrative feasibility, still, I do not 






















                                                          





 It has become clear that the laissez-faire financial capitalism, which prevailed up 
to the economic crisis, is no longer tolerable. Advocates of fiscal consolidation wish for 
a smaller financial system, serving the interests of the real economy.153 By increasing the 
costs of transactions, the FTT is capable of reducing the size of the financial sector, 
simultaneously generating high revenues. Even though, in my view, no discrimination 
results from the FTT, reasoning conveys that the transactions mostly affected by the tax 
are short-term and speculative. The reduction of volatility and technical trading is thus 
accomplished. The purpose of placing “sand in the wheels of finance”,154 in other words, 
stabilizing the financial sector, requires more than tax neutrality, tapping into the 
corrective potential of taxation. 
 The sector targeted by the proposed tax is highly responsive to tax design, 
consequently, policy makers recognized their greatest challenge as being the possible 
occurrence of substitution behaviour or relocation of activities. Accordingly, definition 
of the tax’s territoriality has significant ramifications, not only on potential evasion but 
similarly on tax administration. The option to use a cumulative application of the 
residence, counterparty and issuance principle was certainly audacious, but wise. The 
aggressive tax avoidance and tax planning measures a tax on financial transactions may 
trigger, call for a well-structured and well thought-out directive. The only manner for 
financial institutions to avoid taxation is by giving up customer basis in the FTT-zone 
States, and not trade financial instruments issued by companies established in those 
States, which is unlikely to occur.  
Opponents of this collaborated action perceive it as an outreach of jurisdiction, 
nevertheless, this view is based on a lack of understanding of international customary 
law. Maan successfully articulates that once a counterparty enters into a transaction on an 
exchange it subjects itself to the rules and regulations of the law governing the exchange, 
therefore, submitting himself to its jurisdiction. This attribution of jurisdiction is not 
                                                          
153 See WATT, ANDREW AND BOTCH,ANDREAS (eds), After the crisis: towards a sustainable growth model, 
(Etui..2010) p. 5 and 6. 





discretionary, a balance must be completed.155 Additionally, all requisites of enhanced 
cooperation are met and there is no violation of EU primary law.  
This dissertation’s objective was clear, to consubstantiate the territorial legality 
and feasibility of the Commission’s proposal. The elucidation of the different 
International Customary Law theories’, and establishment of the substantive and genuine 
connection as the most adequate, served as a basis for the succeeding territorial analysis. 
It is my conviction that the arguments conveyed in Chapter 2 are sufficient to defend the 
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Attachment I – Citation Rules 
 
Bibliographic references are quoted by author, title, editor, edition number (if 
there is more than one) and year. As for collective work, besides the referred elements, 
the title of the work is included, preceded by the word in, followed by the identification 
of coordinators, signalised by the expression ed or eds (if there is one or more 
coordinators). 
For periodic publications, a mention is made to author, work title, volume 
number, periodic publication’s title, beginning of the page of the article and date.  
Relative to internet publications, the same order is followed, author, title, editor, 
edition number and year, preceded by the expressions available at, followed by the link 
to the website.  
In the first quote all of the references formerly made are included. In the 
additional quotes, the author’s name is the only reference made, if the author has more 
than one book, the title of the book is also referred to. If the book was written by more 
than one author, the name of the first author is referred to, followed by the expression et 
al.  
In the case of existing consecutive quotes, referring to the same author and work, 
the expression ibid. is used subsequent to the first quote. In order to refer to the page the 
expression p. is employed, to indicate that the quote likewise refers to subsequent pages, 
et al is applied.  
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Attachment IV- The contrast between the Swedish and UK’s 
experiences 
Swedish experience 
 In January 1984 Sweden implemented a tax on the purchase and sale of domestic 
equities at the rate of 0.5% per transaction, these rates were doubled in 1986. The tax 
applied to all security trades in Sweden which used local brokerage services, it also 
covered stock options.158 If two foreign parties were conducting an exchange with a 
Swedish broker tax liability was only born if the traded security was registered in 
Sweden.159 The tax was unable to generate expected revenues and led to a substantial 
relocation of transactions. Relocation was accomplished by not using Swedish broker 
services, or by the establishment of off-shore accounts and using foreign brokers to 
purchase Swedish shares. The Swedish flop can be explained by the implementation of 
high tax rates and by the reduced jurisdictional scope of the tax, as it only applied to 
securities traded by Swedish brokers, which made relocation exceedingly uncomplicated 
and inexpensive.  
UK’s experience 
 The UK stamp duty on trades of securities can be divided into two: a stamp duty 
covering the transfer of financial instruments and a stamp duty reserve tax, otherwise 
known as SDRT, which was only introduced in 1986. The Stamp Duty Reserve Tax is 
charged on underlying agreements to transfer securities where an instrument is not 
executed, it ensures that tax would be payable even where there was no transfer document 
involved, such as transactions through electronic share dealing systems. Stamp Duty taxes 
the registration of ownership of a financial instrument. The purchaser is liable to pay the 
tax, the issuer will only pay the tax when new stock is issued.160 The tax rate is of 0, 5%, 
in other words the same as the initial rate of the Swedish FTT. The tax is enacted by the 
documents used to effect the sale and transfer of ownership in financial instruments of 
UK-based corporations. The need to register ownership triggers taxation.161 The British 
stamp duty is a worldwide tax on ownership transfer of companies incorporated in the 
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United Kingdom, independently of whether the trader is foreign or domestic.162 The 
Stamp Duty is considered a successful tax policy, contrary to the Swedish tax, its success 
may be attributed to its territorial independence and keen tax design. As the levying of 
stamp duty is independent of the location of the trade and the investor, large substitution 
effects do not arise. 
 It is therefore important to understand what differentiates both taxes, and which 
tax design features dictate success or failure. In my judgment, the key is to ensure that the 
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Attachment V- Substance over form and Anti-avoidance 
measures in the Proposed Directive. 
 
Anti-avoidance is defined by Justice Reddy as the art of dodging tax without 
breaking the law, this feature differentiates the concept from tax evasion.163 Tax planning 
must be understood as a matter of degree: There are acceptable tax avoidance conducts; 
on the other side of the spectrum there are transactions which are legal but have the 
objective of eluding tax structures. Tax avoidance processes are therefore composed of 
three basic elements: they must be designed to avoid or reduce liability to tax, their sole 
purpose must be to avoid tax, consequently lacking a commercial purpose, and they must 
be outside of the legislative intent. Following the Cater Commission report categorization 
of anti-avoidance provisions, the measure adopted by the proposed directive is known as 
the administrative approach: a general anti-abuse measure which applies a justice test, 
whereby the responsibility of identifying these artificial arrangements is left to the 
discretion of tax authorities.164 The revised proposal contains a general anti-abuse 
measure, the objective is to fight artificial arrangements lacking commercial substance 
and with the essential purpose of avoiding FTT, contrary to the object, spirit and purpose 
of the regime.  
The artificial test of substance over form is a guiding principle in general anti-
avoidance rules.165 FTT’s territorial scope is limited by an “economic substance” 
provision, according to which, if the subject liable for payment proves that there is no 
economic link between the transaction and the territory of the Member State, then it is 
not deemed to be established in it. There is no reference to the definition of economic 
substance nor are there any examples provided. However, the Court of Justice as already 
intervened in economic substance cases concerning the VAT Directive, which can be 
used as guidelines for the FTT.166  
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